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# LIEUTENANT GENERAL NATHAN BEDFORD FORREST: AN UNTUTORED MILITARY GENIUS

Lonnie E. Maness, Ph.D.

The Confederacy had many outstanding military leaders. One of these was the world-famous cavalry leader, Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest, a man that was unique in many ways. He was one of the truly great military leaders in the War Between the States, a leader whose exploits have been studied and will continue to be studied as long as wars and armies are necessary.

To understand Forrest, it is necessary to know something about his background. He was born on July 13, 1821, at Chapel Hill in the Duck River area of Middle Tennessee. Nathan Bedford Forrest was the eldest of nine children born to William and Mariam Beck Forrest. The family moved to Tippah County in northwest Mississippi in 1834, where William died in 1837. Forrest, not yet sixteen years of age, became the head of the family, subject only to the authority of his mother. He led his family from a struggling poverty to a very comfortable existence. While growing up, both in Chapel Hill and in Tippah County, Forrest had some interesting experiences. In Chapel Hill, while Forrest and some young friends were picking blackberries, they encountered a rattlesnake. The other boys ran because of their fear but not Forrest. He killed the snake with a stick, demonstrating that he was not easily frightened. In Tippah County a panther clawed his mother, and Forrest took his gun and dog and tracked down the offending animal and killed it, demonstrating his determination and persistence.<sup>1</sup> These and other experiences would serve him well in the business world as well as in the military.

Forrest went into the livery stable and livestock business with his uncle Jonathan Forrest in Hernando, Mississippi, in 1842. He married Mary Ann Montgomery in 1845, and six years later the family moved to Memphis, Tennessee, where Forrest dealt in cotton, plantations, livestock, real estate, and slaves. Though Forrest had very little formal education, two to three years at most, he had a high level of intelligence, common sense, and good judgment. By the time he was forty years of age he was a wealthy man. When the Civil War began, he was worth approximately \$1,500,000. After Tennessee seceded from the Union in June 1861, Forrest enlisted in the ranks as a private but did not remain long in that capacity.

Governor Isham G. Harris of Tennessee knew Forrest was a man of means and ability and commissioned him to raise a battalion of Mounted Rangers. Forrest soon accomplished this task, even equipping his men at his own expense, and he was appointed their lieutenant colonel.<sup>3</sup> He was promoted to colonel on March 16, 1862, fought and was wounded at Shiloh, and by July 21, 1862, he was a brigadier general and had begun his career of brilliant cavalry raiding,<sup>4</sup> primarily behind enemy lines. Forrest was promoted to major general on December 4, 1863, and to lieutenant general on February 28, 1865, and when he surrendered at Gainesville, Alabama, on May 9, 1865, he was the "last Confederate Command under arms East of the Mississippi" River.<sup>5</sup>

Forrest reminds me of other great military leaders such as Alexander the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte's accomplishments do shed some light on the methods and tactics of General Forrest. For example, Napoleon believed in attacking his enemy first whenever possible. He believed in developing superior strategy and tactics, and he especially believed in surprise and envelopment movement. Napoleon was also fond of saying that in war the leader dominated everything; he believed that

it was the leader that provided the edge for victory. Though Forrest had no military training of a formal nature, he duplicated many of the tactics of Napoleon.<sup>6</sup> Forrest believed in hitting the enemy on the flanks, front and rear and keeping the pressure on. Although Forrest probably could not have named a single principal of war as such, few generals, if any, made better application of these principles.<sup>7</sup> It may also be pointed out that Forrest and Ulysses S. Grant were very similar in their views on the art of war. Grant stated: "The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on."<sup>8</sup> Forrest stated that he won victories "by getting there first with the most men, planning and making my own fight, never letting the other fellow make the fight for me...Strike the first blow...Get them skeered and keep the skeer on them...charge and give them hell."<sup>9</sup> However, Grant and Forrest differed in their opportunities. Grant commanded armies and could put his ideas into operation. Forrest commanded small units and could not do this.

This is not the occasion to discuss in detail the many victorious campaigns that Forrest was engaged in. However, several will be discussed in order to illustrate his military genius. First, there was the Fort Donelson campaign of February 1862, a campaign that was mismanaged by General Albert Sidney Johnston.<sup>10</sup> Forrest was a lieutenant colonel and in command of all the cavalry in this campaign. After the Confederates attacked Grant's right wing and were pushing the Federals, Forrest saw two Union brigades--those of Richard Oglesby and Charles Cruft--in headlong retreat. Forrest advised an all out attack at this time in order to make the rout complete, but the general on the field, fearing an ambush, would not order the attack. When the fighting ended shortly after noon the Federals had been pushed back a couple of miles. The way to Nashville was now open. However, the Confederates went back within their entrenchments around Dover and Fort Donelson and that very night decided to surrender.<sup>11</sup>

Generals John B. Floyd, Simon B. Buckner, and Gideon J. Pillow believed that by nightfall the Federals had moved back up to their former positions and had cut off their escape route. Forrest told them this was not so, but they would not believe him. Forrest advised retreat--get the entire Confederate force out of Fort Donelson. However, the decision to surrender stood. Forrest asked for permission to take his cavalry out before the surrender took place. He was given permission and did so by the very route that he had told the generals was still open. And so it was that about ten to twelve thousand Confederate troops became prisoners of war, along with all their equipment.<sup>12</sup> This was a most deplorable mistake, one of the worst of the war. Why so? It is highly probable that if General Johnston had these troops at Shiloh on April 6--one more strong corps--that the Union army under Grant would have been defeated that first day, and General Don Carlos Buell would have been forced to retreat. Given that eventuality all of Middle and West Tennessee could have been reoccupied and a good part of Kentucky as well. The war could have been turned around in the West.

Forrest fought gallantly at Shiloh, helping take the Hornet's Nest. By this time Johnston was dead and P.G.T. Beauregard was in command. Thinking that Buell was still one or two days march from Pittsburg Landing, Beauregard called off the fighting when there was still approximately one hour of daylight remaining. The Confederate army was victorious on April 6; the next day the work would be completed. Forrest advised a last ditch effort to capture Grant's last line of defense at Pittsburg Landing before darkness set in. Then around midnight and again shortly thereafter Forrest, having received reports from the men he sent through the Union lines to Pittsburg Landing, went to higher command and reported that Buell's men were being ferried

across the Tennessee River as fast as the steamboats could do so. Forrest advised a night attack or an immediate retreat, but, once again, nothing was done. The next day the Confederate army was driven from the field and retreated to Corinth, Mississippi.<sup>13</sup>

A few weeks after the Shiloh campaign ended, Forrest was transferred to Middle Tennessee when, on July 13, 1862, he captured the town of Murfreesboro and the Federal garrison of some 1,500 infantry and cavalry plus a battery of artillery, more men than Forrest had in his command. Then after General Braxton Bragg's disastrous invasion of Kentucky in the fall of 1862, the Army of Tennessee moved back into Middle Tennessee and took up positions at Murfreesboro and along Stones River.<sup>14</sup>

Desiring to maximize his position and weaken the Federal army at Nashville as much as possible, Bragg sent Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan on a raid into Kentucky to disrupt communications and supplies moving south on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The raid was a complete success. Bragg also ordered Brigadier General Forrest and his brigade of untrained and poorly equipped cavalry to move into West Tennessee and do several things. He was to disrupt the railroad system from just south of Jackson, Tennessee, northward to Moscow, Kentucky. This would hurt General Grant who was then moving on Vicksburg from the northeast. It would also engage and tie down about twenty thousand Federal troops in West Tennessee, and thus none could be sent to reinforce the Federal army at Nashville that was about to move against General Bragg.<sup>15</sup>

After crossing the Tennessee River at Clifton, Forrest spread rumors and handled his command in such a way that it was soon reported that he had anywhere between ten and twenty thousand men with him. Forrest did this in order to put his adversaries on the defensive, and it worked. This made it easier for Forrest to accomplish his mission. He captured about one hundred fifty Federal troops at Lexington, including their commander. Colonel Robert G. Ingersoll, the agnostic. Forrest next invaded Jackson and destroyed the railroad to the south of Jackson. With superior forces, Forrest captured Trenton and its garrison; he also captured Humboldt and Union City and their garrisons, and he destroyed some fifty bridges on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. Forrest also destroyed every bit of trestle work on that railroad, destroyed culverts, and captured large numbers of prisoners and supplies. In fact, his command was now equipped with the latest weapons of war, plenty of ammunition and other supplies.<sup>16</sup>

On his return to Clifton, Forrest fought two Federal infantry brigades at Parker's Crossroads (Red Mound), located some ten miles north of Lexington. He had Colonel Byrus L. Dunham's brigade whipped when he was surprised by the other brigade, led by Colonel John W. Fuller, and had to make a hasty retreat. When Forrest recrossed the river at Clifton, and because he constantly recruited while on this campaign, his brigade was larger than when he entered West Tennessee; it also had a surplus of the latest weapons, blankets and ammunition. Forrest accomplished his mission. Grant had to give up on his movement against Vicksburg at this time, and not a single reinforcement was sent to the Federal army that fought at Stones River. Indeed, from this point forward the name of Bedford Forrest became synonymous with victory. He came to be regarded in the West as Stonewall Jackson was in the East.<sup>17</sup>

Forrest and his cavalry played a conspicuous role in the Battle of Chickamauga on September 18-20, 1863, where Forrest was in command of all the cavalry on the right wing of the army. On September 20, Lieutenant General James Longstreet's troops found an opening in the Union line and drove through, splitting the Union army in two. Soon most of the boys in blue were wildly retreating to Chattanooga. Early on the morning of September 21, Forrest saw a demoralized, beaten army moving toward and into Chattanooga. He sent a dispatch to General Leonidas Polk for the attention of the commanding

general appraising him of the situation and urging him to immediately follow up on the victory won on the field at Chickamauga. "One hour," Forrest said, "is worth the lives of a thousand men." All day Monday, September 21, the privates in the ranks were asking, "Why don't we follow our victory?" But General Bragg did not move. Forrest went to see Bragg and personally urged him to move immediately, but nothing would move Bragg, and a splendid opportunity was lost. Forrest knew, and there is little doubt that he was correct, that the Federal army would not have stopped at Chattanooga if the Confederate army had pressed them immediately and hard.<sup>18</sup> But this did not happen. They had time to entrench in Chattanooga and time to receive reinforcements, and thus a splendid opportunity was thrown away because of the incompetence of Braxton Bragg. Though few of them realized it at the time, General Bragg's soldiers were seeing the last great opportunity of the Confederacy fade into history. Forrest soon became so exasperated with Bragg that he threatened to slap his face. Forrest was soon transferred to a new command in northern Mississippi and West Tennessee where he had to raise yet another command for himself.<sup>19</sup>

With his new command, Forrest made two raids into Tennessee. The first was in March 1864, and extended into the first part of May. On this raid Forrest was able to capture Union City and its garrison. He also captured Paducah, Kentucky, and Fort Pillow. And I might add that contrary to what some historians have said there was no massacre of black troops at Fort Pillow. The fort was taken because of superior numbers and tactics, and the casualty rate was high because of the incompetence of the Fort's commander. While at his headquarters in Jackson, Tennessee, Forrest realized that General William Tecumseh Sherman would soon start his Atlanta campaign. On April 4, April 6, and April 15 Forrest gave advice respectively to Leonidas Polk, Joseph E. Johnston, and President Davis which could have changed the course of the war. He advised that his and Stephen D. Lee's cavalry, some 12,000 men, be combined for a raid on Sherman's supply line. Tear up the railroad from Chattanooga through Nashville and on to Louisville, Kentucky. This is, in fact, what Sherman feared the most. However, Forrest's advise was not followed.<sup>20</sup> The second raid was in the fall of 1864, and led ultimately to the destruction of several gunboats, transports, and Federal supplies worth in the millions of dollars at Johnsonville, Tennessee.<sup>21</sup>

The last example of Forrest's military ability was his command of all the cavalry for the Army of Tennessee under the command of General John Bell Hood as it invaded Tennessee in November 1864. Forrest and his men screened and covered the way for the advancing Confederate Army as it moved north into Middle Tennessee. Hood let slip a splendid opportunity for destroying General John M. Schofield's 22,000 men at Spring Hill, Tennessee. Hood pursued Schofield to Franklin where a disastrous battle took place. Numerous Confederate generals lost their lives along with over 1,700 rank and file. Another 3,800 were so disabled as to be placed in Franklin hospitals, and 702 men were captured. Numerous others were slightly wounded and not hospitalized.<sup>22</sup> All of this could have been avoided had Hood listened to the advise of Bedford Forrest. Forrest saw that the Federal positions at Franklin were almost impregnable and urged Hood to give him one infantry division to use with his cavalry and he would flank the Federals out of Franklin. This probably would not have affected the outcome of the campaign, but it would have prevented the blood bath at Franklin, and it would have taken longer to drive the Army of Tennessee out of the Volunteer State.<sup>23</sup>

Much information has been omitted that reflects glory on Forrest such as the Battle of Brice's Crossroads, the raid on Memphis, and the capture of Colonel Streight, but enough has been covered to illustrate the genius of Nathan Bedford Forrest. He was a

real leader of men, a leader that his men could look up to and follow. He led them and wouldn't ask them to do anything he wouldn't do. During the four years of war Bedford Forrest personally killed more men in combat than all the other generals on either side of the war put together. He killed some thirty men with his sword, pistol and carbine on the field of battle, and he had twenty nine horses shot from under him.<sup>24</sup> Forrest was a great general who did not know the principles of war by name, but he sure knew how to execute those principles and in a way that confounded his adversaries.

Forrest's troops recognized his genius at the time they served. President Davis came to recognize his genius but too late. Had Forrest's advice been followed at Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Chickamauga, and while he was on his West Tennessee--West Kentucky raid in the spring of 1864, the outcome of the war could possibly have been changed. The same thing could have happened had Forrest been utilized in army command. In any event, General Sherman feared Forrest, and after the war he remarked that when all things were considered Forrest was the most remarkable man the war produced on either side. General Joseph E. Johnston said essentially the same thing as did General P.G.T. Beauregard. To Beauregard, "Forrest's capacity for war seemed only to be limited by the opportunities for its display."<sup>25</sup> General Robert E. Lee stated: "He accomplished more with fewer troops than any other officer on either side."<sup>26</sup> The British military leader, Field Marshal Garnet Wolsley, also talked about Forrest's military tactics in the most glowing of terms. He said that no soldier more thoroughly illustrated Napoleon's maxim that in war the man--the leader--was everything.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, as Jac Weller has well stated in his 1959 article in the *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*: "Professional soldiers will do well to continue to study Forrest; military historians yet unborn will consider and reconsider his place in fame, and Americans of yesterday, today, and tomorrow can take pride in a great native hero."<sup>28</sup>

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Tully Brown, "Lecture Given at the Vendome Theatre in Nashville, Tennessee on January 26, 1905," Confederate Collection, Manuscript Section, File F436, F72B7, Tennessee Library and Archives, p.14; Eric W. Shappard, *Bedford Forrest: The Confederacy's Greatest Cavalryman* (Dayton, Ohio: Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1981), pp. 15-19.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 15-16. John Allan Wyeth, *Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest* (Dayton, Ohio, Press of Morningside Bookshop 1975), pp. 18-22; Captain J. Harvey Mathes, *General Forrest* (New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1902), pp. 13-14; Sheppard, *Bedford Forrest*, pp. 23-24; Robert Selph Henry, *First With the Most Forrest* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), pp. 25-27.

<sup>3</sup>*Southern Historical Society Papers*, Vol. 7, p. 455; Thomas Jordan and J.P. Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. N.B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry* (Dayton, Ohio: Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1973), pp. 41-44; Wyeth, *Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, pp. 24-26.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 74-75; Jordan and Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieut.-General N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry*, 105-107; Lonnie E. Maness, *An Untutored Genius: The Military Career of General Nathan Bedford Forrest* (Oxford, Mississippi: The Guild Bindery Press, 1990), pp. 57-81.

<sup>5</sup>Henry, *First With the Most Forrest*, p. 209; *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 69 vols and index (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1882), Series I, part 3, 31:853. Hereinafter this work will be cited as *Official Records*. It is interesting to note that Forrest's rank of major general began on the date he entered West Tennessee in December 1863 to recruit his new command. See also Maness, *An Untutored Genius: The Military Career of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, pp. 356, 372.

<sup>6</sup>Brown, "Lecture Given at the Vendome Theatre in Nashville, Tennessee on January 26, 1905," pp. 1-14.

<sup>7</sup>Maness, *An Untutored Genius: The Military Career of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*.

<sup>8</sup>David Donald, ed., *Why the North Won the Civil War* (New York: Collier Books, 1960), pp. 5-6, 51.

<sup>9</sup>John W. Morton, *The Artillery of Nathan Bedford Forrest's Cavalry* (Kennesaw, Georgia: Continental Book Co., 1962), pp. 181, 198; Walter E. Pittman, Jr., "General Nathan Bedford Forrest and Military Leadership," *The West Tennessee Historical Society Papers*, Vol. XXV, October 1981, p. 54.

<sup>10</sup>Maness, *An Untutored Genius: The Military Career of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, pp. 31-52. If Johnston had concentrated at Fort Donelson as he did at Shiloh, the Confederates would have outnumbered the Federals. A victory probably would have resulted. Charles P. Roland, in "Albert Sidney Johnston and the Loss of Forts Henry and Donelson," *Journal of Southern History*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1957, pp. 45-69, disagrees. Roland admits that rushing most of the troops at Bowling Green to Donelson was "perhaps the most likely possibility of destroying Grant's army." He also admits that Johnston was "censurable for failing to go in person to Fort Donelson for his presence there might have saved most of the fifteen thousand Southern soldiers lost in the surrender." Nevertheless, Roland maintains that there never was any real chance of massing against Grant and annihilating his army. To Roland this pre-supposes that "the Union generals would have persisted in the very course that they in fact did follow." He thinks their reaction would have been different. For example, more troops would have been rushed to Grant by Buell and Halleck. Besides, Grant, with the protection of his gunboats, could have remained at Fort Henry and defended himself easily. These are mere suppositions on the part of Roland. The time element being what it was Grant would not in all probability have known about a concentration of all the Bowling Green troops at Fort Donelson had Johnston ordered it. Being the aggressive fighter that he was Grant probably would have gone forward in any event. Look at his audacity in the Vicksburg campaign of 1863, when he divided his army and crossed the Mississippi River at Bruinsburg in late April. He would have faced almost certain disaster had General Pemberton concentrated against him at that point, and Grant had no way of knowing he wouldn't do exactly that.

<sup>11</sup>John Allan Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest: Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 46; Jordan and Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry*, p. 74; Andrew Lytle, *Bedford Forrest and His Critter Company* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1931), p. 66.

<sup>12</sup>*Official Records*, Series 1, 7:269, 287-288, 295-298, 300, 333, 386, 396; Jordan and Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry*, p. 88; Wyeth, *That Devil Forrest*, pp. 52, 58. Forrest led about 800 men, mostly cavalry, but some infantrymen and a few from the artillery, across the swollen icy waters of Lick Creek and ultimately on to Nashville and without incident in leaving Fort Donelson. As Benjamin Franklin Cooling point out in *Forts Henry and Donelson: The Key to the Confederate Heartland* (1987), the rest of the Confederates forces at Fort Donelson could have escaped as Forrest and his men did.

<sup>13</sup>Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, 4 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1956), 1:530, 602; Wiley Sword, *Shiloh: Bloody April* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1974), pp. 378-379; James Lee McDonough, *Shiloh--In Hell Before Night* (Knoxville, Tn.: The University of Tennessee Press, 1977), p. 194; Jordan and Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry*, pp. 135-137; Grady McWhiney, *Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 247; Henry, *First With the Most Forrest*, pp. 79-81.

<sup>14</sup>Maness, *An Untutored Genius: The Military Career of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, pp. 67-85.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 85-88.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 88-98.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 98-117; Aiding in making Grant give up on the Vicksburg campaign from the northeast was General Earl Van Dorn's December raid on and capture of Grant's supply base at Holly Springs, Mississippi.

<sup>18</sup>Brown, "Lecture Given at the Vendome Theatre in Nashville, Tennessee on January 26, 1905," pp. 1-14. *Southern Historical Society Papers*, Vol. 12, p. 223; Wyeth, *Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, pp. 259-260. In explaining why he did not move, Bragg said that the army did not have the supplies for such a movement. Forrest, however, told Bragg that if they moved immediately they could capture plenty of enemy supplies at Chattanooga, something that Forrest had made a fine art of. It should be noted that General Rosecrans, the Union Commander, had made preparations to evacuate Chattanooga if pressed immediately. For example, from Chattanooga Rosecrans wired General James D. Morgan at Bridgeport, Alabama, and told him to "secure the bridges at Bridgeport and Battle Creek at all hazards." On the evening of the twentieth Rosecrans wired General Halleck, stating: "We have met with a serious disaster; extent not yet ascertained...(The) enemy overwhelmed us." The next morning, September 21, in a telegram to Lincoln, Rosecrans was even more specific. "After two days of the severest fighting I ever witnessed our right and center were beaten. The left held its position until sunset. Our loss is heavy and our troops were down...We have no certainty of holding our position here. If Burnside could come immediately it would be well; otherwise he may not be able to join us unless he comes on west side of river." See *Official Records*, Series 1, Part 1, 30: 142, 149-150.

<sup>19</sup>Henry, *First With the Most Forrest*, pp. 193-212; Brown, "Lecture Given at the Vendome Theatre in Nashville, Tennessee, on January 26, 1905." Maness, *An Untutored Genius: the Military Career of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, p. 179. This new command was raised in West Tennessee in December 1863. Forrest went into West Tennessee with 450 armed men and left with well 3000.

<sup>20</sup>Lonnie E. Maness, "The Fort Pillow Massacre: Fact or Fiction," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XLV, Number 4, Winter 1986, pp. 287-315; Maness, *An Untutored Genius: The Military Career of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, chapter 8; *Official Records*, Series 1, Part 1, 32: 607-612; *ibid.*, Series 1, Part 2, 52:653, *Ibid.*, Series 1, Part 3, 34:184.

<sup>21</sup>Henry, *First with the Most Forrest*, chapter 23.

<sup>22</sup>Jordan and Pryor, *The Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry*, pp. 625-626; Wyeth, *Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, p. 544; Maness, *An Untutored Genius: The Military Career of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, pp. 317-340; James L. McDonough and Thomas L. Connelly, *Five Tragic*

*Hours: The Battle of Franklin* (Knoxville, Tn.: The University of Tennessee Press, 1983), chapter 7; *Official Records*, Series 1, Part 1, 45:654. Spring Hill should never have been a lost opportunity. Had Hood invaded Tennessee a week earlier he would have missed Schofield completely and could have appeared before Nashville before Thomas was reinforced by Schofield, and, obviously, there would have been no battle of Franklin.

<sup>23</sup>Henry, *First With the Most Forrest*, p. 397.

<sup>24</sup>John W. Green, "General Nathan Bedford Forrest," a speech delivered twice in 1944 by Attorney Green to audiences interested in Forrest's life and career, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tennessee.

<sup>25</sup>William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, 2 vols. (New York, 1875), 2:399; *Official Records*, Series 1, Part 3, 34:275; Glenn Tucker, "Untutored Genius of the War," *Civil War Times Illustrated*, p. 36; Wyeth, *Life of General Nathan Bedford Forrest*, pp. 635-636; Dabney H. Maury, *Recollections of A Virginian* (New York, 1894), p. 150

<sup>26</sup>Charles Bracelen Flood, *Lee: The Last Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981), p. 146.

<sup>27</sup>*Southern Historical Society Papers*, Vol. XX, *New Orleans Picayune*, April 10, 1892; *United Service Magazine*, Vol. 5; Brown, "Lecture Given at the Vendome Theatre in Nashville, Tennessee on January 26, 1905," p. 14.

<sup>28</sup>Jac Weller, "Nathan Bedford Forrest: An Analysis of Untutored Military Genius," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, 18 (September 1959): 213-251.

